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Abstract
This paper begins with a brief survey of research evidence establishing
that crisis decisions — as opposed to routine decisions — are
characterized by uncertainty, complexity, conflicting interests, and ego
involvement
.
The following section integrates empirical evidence from many research
fields to how two main features of human information processing —
cognitive expansion and cognitive reduction — interact with the formidable
challenges of uncertainty, complexity, and multiple interests to affect
decision making in a crisis.
Lastly, the paper briefly describes and evaluates a number of promising
techniques geared toward decision making with the practical difficulties of
responding to crises.

UNCERTAINTY, COMPLEXITY, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST,
EMOTIONAL INVOLVEMENT, AND THE QUALITY OF
CRISIS THINKING
Charles I. Stubbart
I. THE INFORMATION PROCESSING DEMANDS OF CRISIS DECISIONS
1. "WICKED PROBLEMS"
Pure ill-structured, "wicked problems" have several characteristics,
including: no definitive problem formulation, no single criteria system or
rule defines correct solutions, no stopping rule for ending formulation
process, an innumerable list of possible operations on the problem,
uncertainty about attacking the problem at a proper level, and that each
wicked problem is unique.
Four characteristics of crises make them very wicked: uncertainty,
complexity, conflicts of interest, and emotional involvement.
i. Uncertainty. Organizational environments are becoming increasingly
"turbulent" (Toffler, 1970). Correspondingly, Braybrooke & Lindblom (1963),
Mintzberg et. al. (1976), and Mason & Mitroff (1979) point out that decision
making essentially entails a process of defining and coping with risky,
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complicated, ill-structured issues. Therefore, coping with uncertainty is a
major element of crisis decision making.
ii. Complexity. Strategists face a daunting task of learning
interrelationships among hundreds of company and industry phenomena. The
complexity is intensified by unstable relationships among phenomena, long
chains of cause and effect, wide ranges of potential strategic action, and
large a number of participating individuals and groups.
Writers such as Quinn (1980), Mintzberg (1973), and Peters and
Waterman (1982) place quite a bit of faith in strategists' intuition. But,
one can easily name instances where intuitions have led to disasterous
decisions. Studies show that highly trained professionals such as bankers
and stock-market analysts (Clarkson, 1962) and business managers (Argyris &
Schon, 1978) occasionally slip into psychological traps and use troublesome
heuristics (Tversky & Kahneman, 1972). In strategic management research,
Schwenk (1984) and Stubbart & Ramaprasad (1985) have demonstrated the
difficulties which complexity poses for strategists.
Based on research evidence, making correct inferences about complex
relationships presents a task which decision makers find difficult to
master.
iii. Conflict of Interests. A particular organization represents
only one minor interest in a broad inter-organizational network. Leading-
edge models of decision making acknowledge the inevitable tradeoffs among
organizational stakeholders, and try to incorporate multiple interests into
the planning process (Freeman, 1984). Additionally, the whole field of
social issues/ social responsibility in business reflects the changing and
ambiguous nature of corporate responsibilities to stakeholding groups.
Consequently, contemporary strategists must weigh the multiple
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interests which make claims on corporate affairs during a crisis.
iv. Ego involvement. We know from interior experience that our
private interests and emotions can often affect thinking. From a
motivation perspective, information has symbolic value, not just neutral,
descriptive value. Accounts show that strategists actively cultivate their
presentation-of-self (Harr, 1985; Iacocca & Novak, 1985). Strategists
sometimes promote alternatives that make them "look good", which could
easily be justified to other people (Staw, 1980). Furthermore, the
responsibilities and autonomy of general management duties in a crisis
guarantee vivid emotional experiences.
Therefore, general managers' emotional involvement in strategic
planning form an important hidden issue to be taken into account as part of
the task of planning.
2. STK-1ARY.
Tackling crisis issues places exceedingly difficult demands on
decision makers. Even though research has documented the chaotic, complex,
and stressful nature of general manager's work (Mintzberg, 1973; Quinn,
1980; Kotter, 1982; Donaldson & Lorsch, 1983) few studies have either
directly measured strategists' practical capacities for decision making
during a crisis, or offered broad, practical techniques for getting the job
done.
II. STRATEGISTS AS INFORMATION PROCESSORS: COGNITIVE ELABORATION
AND COGNITIVE REDUCTION.
A pivotal question about cisis decision making can be posed as
follows: If crisis decisions are characterized by uncertainty, complexity,
:onflicts of interest, and emotional involvement, can crisis thinking
fulfill the information processing role envisioned?
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1. MANAGERS AS INFORMATION PROCESSORS?
Building an empirical foundation for the cognitive aspects of decision
making from scratch would entail an enormous task. Fortunately, research
results from many fields have already laid a partial groundwork. Relevant
issues have received extensive study in the fields of organization
behavior, attribution theory, social psychology, social inference,
behavioral accounting, consumer decision-making, artificial intelligence,
and behavioral decision theory. It is against this background of empirical
research, examining the skills and practical abilities of strategists that
a viable basis for thinking about crisis thinking must be established.
Before launching into the research evidence on uncertainty, complexity
conflict of interest, and emotional involvement, it is important to give a
brief synopsis of two key features of human information processing —
cognitive elaboration, and cognitive reduction.
i. Active Information Processing. Strategic management stresses
objectivity. "Objectivity" in the sense that right-thinking observers of
objects and events must agree upon what these objects and events represent,
and their derivative implications. Hence, theorists talk about the
"objective environment." But, cognitive science raises unsettling questions
about "objectivity."
Thinking about a crisis rapidly becomes enormously complex.
Variables, explanations, consequences, causes, relationships, alternatives,
participants, goals, and potentials form a dense mass. According to Bruner
(1957):
"The most characteristic thing about mental life, over and beyond the
fact that one apprehends the events of the world around one, is that one
constantly goes beyond the information given."
Similarly, Lindsay £ Normann (1972) describe an information-finding process
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is mainly an interpretative activity:
"A large part of the interpretation of sensory data is provided
by the knowledge of what the signal must be, rather than from the
information contained in the signal itself. This extra
information comes from the context of the sensory event" (p. 133).
This means that human information processors are unlike computers — people
are not "clerks." Instead, cognitive processes form a continuum. Automatic
processes, requiring little attention, little effort, and minor mental
activity, occupy one end of this continuum. Recognizing colors is an
automatic process which offers some prospect for "objectivity." At the
other end of the continuum lie "effortful processes . . . greatly
influenced by such conditions as personal intention, learning, and social
influence" (Kiesler & Sproull, 1982). Effortful processes invoke complex
webs of sensing, coding, decoding, storing, selecting, channeling, etc.
For example, in studying human memory, Bartlett (1932) and Xeisser (1967)
found that remembering is a dynamic, erratic process, intrinsically shaped
by personal expectations, motivations, and ideas of what must-have-been.
Many of the significant phenomena of in a crisis — "threats," "potential
losses," "company image," "morale," — are not matters of direct sensory
perception. As Neisser remarked:
"Although we cannot always see only what we want to see, we generally
can think what we like." (Neisser; 1967, p. 305).
Instead, consequences and phenomena are worked-over, abstract, linguistic
interpretations.
Themes of active processing and "enactment" have recently tunneled
their way into organization theory (Weick, 1979) and strategic management
[Smircich S Stubbart, 1985; Chaffee, 1985). Enactment connotes an
incorrigible subjective and historical aspect of management, opposite to
many scholars' quest for impersonal, objective, approaches to knowledge and action.
5
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Strategists are inquisitive about their industrial playgrounds. They want
to know why things happen, to fully understand the games they are playing.
Strategists actively combine new information into attributions, building
complex schematic representations of an "environment," which provide a
basis for inferences about strategic actions. However, their strategic
knowledge and the wisdom of their actions inevitably rest on the active,
shifting foundations of innumerable private memories, motives, experiences,
interpretations and inferences (Hall, 1976, 1934). There is simply no
neutral matrix for separating what is "given" from what is added by the
"mind."
ii. Information Overload and Cognitive Reduction. The modern business
environment teems with puzzling, complex, and uncertain facts and events.
Individuals command limited mental capacity for noticing, and attending to
information available to them (Miller, 1956). Simon (1955) wrote that in a
context of infinite potential information, managers must arrange an
infinitely reduced problem space — in line with their bounded rationality:
" Furthermore, managers "satisfice", choosing the first satisfactory
solution
. . . content to rely upon ... a drastically simplified model of
the buzzing, blooming confusion that constitutes the real world" (1955, p.xxix).
No crisis decision maker can possibly attend to more than a slight fraction
of this tidal wave of potential information (Hambrick S Mason, 1934). For
them, information overload is inevitable.
Studies show that coping with a tidal wave of information fosters
subjective, idiosyncratic heuristics in strategy making (Keegan, 1974;
McCaskey 1982; Schwenk, 1934; Duhaime & Schwenk, 1985, 3arnes, 1984).
Because making crisis decisions involves enormous informational
complexities, it also necessitates drastic representational
simplifications.
n
3. SU1HARY.
Cognitive elaboration and cognitive reduction form a background for
thinking about crisis decision making. The following sections summarize
research evidence about cognitive elaboration and cognitive reduction as
these affect decision making.
III. THINKING ABOUT UNCERTAINTY
1. COGNITIVE EXPANSION ANT) UNCERTAINTY
i. Information Search. Search is a outreaching and expansive process.
Active search is best viewed as a positive choice, not a negative filtering
or a cue-driven behavior (Neisser, 1967). It begins at the focal point of
major uncertainties in the current organizational situation (Simon S March,
1958). The greater the uncertainty, the greater the incentive to actively
search (Ebert S Mitchell, 1975). Whether strategists will search for
information during a crisis partly depends upon the time pressure they
feel. But, even under time pressure, they are likely to search for
information not readily available from standard information systems. This
kind of searching is active. If decision makers cannot find the right
information along simple, familiar, well-worn paths in memory, they expand
search; question people, head for their files, hire consultants, and so
forth. Research shows the overwhelming importance search patterns have
for later steps in decision making (Posner, 1973).
ii. Creativity. Relentless research effort lias gone into explorations
of the psychology of creativity. Topics have ranged from day-dreaming to
studies of scientists (Roe, 1952) and writers (Barron, 1955), to
introspective accounts of the creative process (Wallas, 1926).
Creative processes apparently require intensive thinking and
experimenting during a protracted time (Wallas, 1926).
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Simon (1966) describes creative thinking as a hierarchical building-up
of elements. "Familiarizing" is a long term process of experimenting with
representations of a problem and storing information about it. Long term
goals and succeeding waves of experience interact to alter goals and alter
memory. When a task is set aside, some problem information and goal
information is always forgotten. When the problem is approached again, the
problem solver must actively reconstruct goals and information, thereby
altering what is "known" about that problem. This explains how periods of
"tinkering" can lead to sudden strategic inspirations.
Although valuable strategic insights seldom occur, we know that some
strategists are quite inventive (e.g. Steve Jobs of Apple; Ray Kroc of
McDonald's; Alfred Sloan of General Motors).
If the response time to a crisis is quite short (such as Bhopal), then
creative responses will probably not have time to gestate. But even in a
case such as Bhopal, there are longer term responses which might allow
creativite responses to develop.
2. COGNITIVE SIMPLIFICATION AND UNCERTAINTY
Besides processes which build more-complex representations, other
processes work to simplify complex representations.
i. Automatic Attention. Individuals react to information which is
concrete, salient, emotionally interesting and distinctive. For example,
nearly everyone over 30 remembers the cisis starting November 22, 1963.
Crises affect memory because they are susceptible to explanation,
elaboration and innuendo. Vivid information can arrive as an event (such
as the Surgeon General's Report on smoking; Miles & Cameron, 1982), or an
impressive communication (Hijacker's demands). Salient people and events
offer themselves as causes of other events (Taylor & Fiske, 1978).
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For a business, crisis information includes: sudden large changes in
financial ratios, unpleasant regulations, emergencies, scandals, flamboyant
goings-on, spectacular competitive developments, or industrial disasters.
Such developments direct a strategist's attention toward current goals.
Strategists may attach greater significance to apparent crises than they
really warrant (Kiesler & Sproull, 1982).
ii. Ignoring uncertainty. People often ignore uncertainty to avoid
unwanted anxiety (Rokeach, 1960). For example, Cyert & DeGroot (1970) found
that firms acted as if interest rates and unemployment policy would always
remain at historical levels. Carter (1971) documented decision-makers
efforts to reduce perceptions of uncertainty in a computer software firm.
Borch (1968) noted that corporate managers expressed annoyance with
consultants who couched their advice in probabilistic terms.
In a crisis the pressure for a rapid, definite response can repress
uncertainties about the situation, alternatives, and consequences of
different actions.
iii. Subjective Probabilities. Behavioral decison theory is a field
which devotes nearly its entire effort toward examining decision making.
Researchers have unearthed a large variety of disturbing findings (see
Taylor, 1984, for specific references):
• People do not evaluate new information in the way that Bayes' Theorem
should apply.
• Individuals inaccurately judge the importance of data types and sources
• Decision makers ignore the base rate at which phenomena occurred in the past
•People believe that events are likely if they can easily recall or
imagine instances.
•Making effort toward a goal, or even anticipating such effort
increases subjects' belief that a desired outcome would actually occur.
9 Even sophisticated scientists make unwarranted generalizations using
results derived from small samples.
• Extreme values overly impress many observers.
People often make predictions about future events by anchoring on a
cue (for example, last year's profit) and adjusting for the
present situation (this year).
Although much of this evidence comes from non-crisis lab experiments using
non-strategists, reseach evidence in the strategy field indicates that
strategists too experience severe difficulties when dealing with
uncertainty (Anderson S Paine, 1975, Wilensky, 1967; Yates, 1983).
3. OUTCOMES - UNRELIABLE FORECASTS.
Individual elaborative and reductive operations have organizational
consequences. Accurate forecasts are a prerequisite for taking sensible
actions in a crisis. Yet institutional forecasting efforts repeatedly fail
(Ascher, 1973). Studies of forecasting accuracy in a variety of realms,
the GNP, the stock market, technology, and political events always show an
abysmal record.
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IV. THINKING ABOUT COMPLEX STRATEGIC ISSUES IN A CRISIS
1 .COGNITIVE EXPANSION AND COMPLEXITY
A strategist works under constant pressure to provide accurate
explanations about events: for himself, for other organization members, and
for outsiders. But, crisis events form a diverse, shadowy and multi-
dimensional set. Therefore, strategists have great latitude in rifling
through events, directing their attention toward certain categories of
events, for attributing cause and effect explanations — for creating
idiosyncratic interpretations. Strategists' conclusions about their
experience, in turn, form the knowledge base for thinking about plans.
10
i. Learning through Causal Attributions and Inference. Attribution
research and concept learning studies how people explain causes and
relationships among personality, behavior and events (see Nisbett £ Ross,
1980 for specific studies).
• Subjects believe that fortuitous associative-pairing of events prove
causal connections. Furthermore, learners are so anxious to find
causal relationships, they even find explanatory rules in strings
of random symbols or events.
•Explanations for an event often favor personality and dispositional
causes over structural "scientific" explanations
• Learning becomes particularly difficult when people attempt to
inductively grasp complex rules and interactions.
•The higher the memory load, the poorer the concept learning.
• People avoid complex calculations in favor of simpler heuristics.
• After subjects choose a tenable hypothesis they often accept confirming data
and reject discontinuing data.
• Learners accept less-convincing data when they receive a lot of it and
it arrives slowly.
9 In the absence of readily apparent relations, subjects are extremely
insensitive to covariation.
•Errors are magnified when data are observed sequentially as in
Everyday experience.
Given a strategist's pressing need to understand complex elements in a
crisis situation, one may conjecture on this evidence that strategists use
intricate but idiosyncratic knowledge about their companies, their
industries, and the economic-social environment.
ii. Complex Knowledge Structures. Patterns in experience are
organized into knowledge structures variously called schemas, scripts, or
cognitive maps (Abelson, 1976; Cantor 8 Mischcl, 1977; Taylor S Crocker, 1981).
Schemas
. . . represent our knowledge about concepts, objects,
situations, events, sequences of events, and actions. A schema contains, as
part of its specification, the network of interrelations that is believed to
normally hold amona consitituents of the concept in question" (Rumelhart,
1980, p.3A).
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Complex schemas are elaborated through comprehension, accretion, memory
trace, tuning and refinement. Mew experiences and thoughts constantly add
increments to modify and extend schemas. Schemas impose structure, impart
meaning, and define the parameters of interpretation for information,
actions, and experiences; allowing individuals to cut corners and make
quick efficient diagnoses — especially helpful during a crisis.
But schematic knowledge has vulnerabilities. Knowledge is tied to
career histories (Dearborn & Simon, 1958). Schematic knowledge resists
change (Kuhn, 1962). When people hold a complex schema, reinforcing
evidence has a greater effect than disconfirming evidence. Schemas
routinely survive falsification.
The general pattern is premature commitments and insufficient
revisions. Therefore, during a crisis, strategists are apt to rely on old,
well-known schemas which might not fit the current circumstances. If they
do so, crisis decisions based on these schemas rely on detailed, powerful,
yet fragile and incomplete knowledge structures.
2. COGNITIVE SIMPLIFICATION AMD COMPLEXITY
i. Deductive Reasoning. Computers are perfectly logical, they can't
operate any other way. But evidence accumulating over the last 30 years
suggests that human reasoning is unlike computer reasoning. Individual
reasoning often fails the test of formal logic (Gardner, 1935). Yet, human
reasoning works well in many tasks. The trick is to axplain the power of
human reasoning and its shortcomings.
Johnson-Laird (1983) has studied syllogistic reasoning. According to
him, reasoners do not translate premises into truth tables, follow
syllogistic rules, and so forth. Instead, they use mental models, an array
of propositional representations of spatial, temporal, and causal
relations. 12
These mental models are robust and viable under many conditions. Mental
models account for a wide range of empirical data on reasoning. The models
also work in computer simulation.
Strategists must draw important conclusions quickly during a crisis.
Therefore, the logical abilities of strategists are an important subject.
If strategists reasoning does not follow the tenets of formal logic, then
important adjustments to decision making norms must ensue.
ii. Forgetting and Reconstructing Memory. Human memory is not like
computer memory. From a monumental set of studies Bartlett concluded:
"Remembering is not the re-excitation of innumberable fixed, lifeless,
and fragmentary traces. It is an imaginative reconstruction, or
construction, built out of the relation of our attitude towards a whole
active mass of past experience. . . It is thus hardly ever really exact,
even the most rudimentary cases of rote recapitulation, and it is not at all
important that it should be so "(Bartlett, 1932, p. 213).
Studies of memory find that (see Eysenck, 1984):
i The activity of remembering itself affects memory contents.
t .Memories slowly decay, losing many of their peripheral associations
and becoming less complex.
• Details are forgotten while meaning is retained.
• !bre difficult mental operations produce more forgetting.
• Eyewitness testimony is quite unreliable.
• ien people encounter new information, memory structures sometimes
fill in details about unknown or uncertain aspects of seemingly
familiar phenomenon.
• People forget information when it doesn't fit their agenda or their plans.
Since strategists must remember prodigious amounts of information to
support a crisis decision, active memory operations will affect their
decisions.
iii. Reasoning by Analogy and Metaphor. Decision makers sometimes
reason by analogy (Steinbruner, 1974; Shrivastava & Dutton, 1983).
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Some metaphors seem to exert a powerful attraction ("the domino theory" of
communist advance). Metaphors and analogies can help decision makers
unravel perplexing choices.
But careless metaphors and analogies can also lead decision makers to
false conclusions.
poUcy.
t Axelrod et al. (1976) uncovered examples of metaphorical reasoning in foreign
i Isenberg (1984) found metaphors and analogies used to define organizational
missions and to frame strategic problems.
• May (1975) and Neustadt & May (1986) traced a large number of cases
false analogies lead top-level government officials to make bad decisions.
Metaphors and analogies are powerful attractions for crisis decision
making, because they are available and simple.
3. OUTCCMES - BOLSTERING SINGLE ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES.
Cognitive bolstering of decisions has been extensively studied by
social psychologists. Festinger (1957) wrote that after any decision,
"congnitive dissonance" - worries about the negative features of the chosen
alternative - bother that decision maker. To end these worries, the
decision maker restructures her thoughts in the direction of the chosen
alternative.
Janis & Mann (1977) reviewed a large number of studies showing how
decision makers also bolster their decisions before decision making:
".
. .
when a decision maker reaches a point when one alternative is
clearly more satisfactory than others, he puts an end to residual
conflict by judging that the uncertain good consequences are more
probable than the uncertain bad consequences" (p. 94-95).
A number of studies show that strategic decisions often fail to evoke
the complex reasoning which they deserve:
• Alexander (1979), Mintzberg et al., (1976), and Mutt (1984) each
catalogued decision processes wherein only one alternative was
seriously proposed, carefully evaluated, and implemented.
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§ '/right (1979) provided an example of how bolstering can affect
strategy in his discussion of how General Motors management
delayed small-car proposals by continually asking for more
information on them.
9 According to Yates (1933) auto industry executives discarded
alternatives involving relatively greater uncertainty.
V. THINKING .ABOUT MULTIPLE INTERESTS DURKG A CRISIS
1. COGNITIVE ELABORATION AND MULTIPLE INTERESTS.
i. Kohlberg (1934) studied individuals' abilities to reason about
moral questions. He developed a classification system consisting of four
stages of moral development. Each level demarcates a more complex type of
moral reasoning. At the postconventional level, the highest level of moral
reasoning, judgments depend on critical assessments of conflicting rights
and obligations, on following logical, universal principles according to
conscience. Kohlberg said that few individuals reach the postconventional
level of cognitive development.
Scholarly accounts and journalism report numerous examples of moral
reasoning affecting top management decisions:
• John Z. DeLorean was described as a business hero one year (Wright,
1979) and a liar and megalomanic the next.
Chief executives are charged with bugging offices and hiring spies
rr, 1935).
• Recent books offer a portrait of arbitrary, greedy, and vengeful
general managers (Iacocca S Novak, 1984; Mintz, 1985: Perrv & Dawson,
1985; Auletta, 1986).
A few sensational, well-publicized cases of general manager's who did
not acknowledge the rights of other groups does not substantiate a blanket
indictment of general managers' moral reasoning. Instead, these incidents
and reports highlight the importance of active cognitive elaboration as a
!gistimate topic in understanding general management thought and beliavior
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under pressure. The moral reasoning of general managers can affect crisis
decisions, particularly as a strategist must weight the rights,
obligations, and rewards for various organizational stakeholders.
2. COGNITIVE SIMPLIFICATION AND MULTIPLE INTERESTS
i. Groupthink. Janis studied stressful, important decisions in
government (Janis, 1972). He reported that certain conditions: directive
leadership, insulation of the group, and lack of systematic procedures for
search and appraisal, combined with a cohesive group and high stress levels
fosters groupthink:
".
. a collective patterns of defensive avoidance, lack of vigilance,
unwarranted optimism, sloganistic thinking, suppression of worrisome
defects, and reliance on shared rationalizations to bolster the least
objectionable alternative" (p.399).
Many corporate strategy making situations harbor the dangers of
"groupthink" (Janis & Mann, 1977; Neustadt & May, 1986). Ironically, the
current emphasis on developing cohesive and committed corporate cultures
often reads like a prescription for groupthink during a crisis!
3. OUTCOME — THE STAKEHOLDER'S REVENGE.
Freeman (1984) described the dangers of relying on oversimplified
strategic analysis tools (such as PIMS or portfolio techniques), lie
pointed out that such techniques are tied to a traditional range of
stakeholders (customers, owners, employees, suppliers), leaving out
important groups (such as environmentalists, courts, and media) which can
greatly influence corporate operations. Typical surprise experiences
resulting from considering too narrow a set of stakeholders include General
Motors collision with Ralph Nader, business episodes of "60 Minutes," the
"Love Canal," incident, and the Tylenol poisonings. Crisis decisions
which neglects important stakeholders may carry a heavy price.
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. HOW EMOTIONAL INVOLVE ENT AFFECTS CRISIS THINKING
"Nothing is greater to one than one's self is."
Song of Myself, Walt Whitman
When texts discuss general managers' personalities and values they
stick to positive role characterizations, such as the "organizational
leader," "personal leader," and "architect of purpose." (Andrews, 1980).
For instance, although many articles talk about the problem of handling a
poorly motivated labor force, none discuss the problems of handling poorly
motivated CEOs. They stress the strategist's "objectivity." This
orientation hampers the development of an adequate empirical profile of
strategists.
People view world events from their own privileged position in it.
Ego-centrism permeates all aspects of thinking. Its effects are universal
and significant. General manager's power and position permit them to
indulge their personal motives, needs, and emotional problems in a fashion
open to few other public figures- and certainly closed to most organization
members. Popular books about organizational culture and excellent
companies stress the desirability of emotional commitment.
Lombardo S McCall studied over 100 top managers working in large
firms. Of those 100 executives, over 70 reported having had top management
superiors who were emotionally intolerable. General managers were
described variously as, "... a living snake and a pathological liar . . .
Attila
. . . Being wrong never slowed him down ... he treated people like
dirt
. .
he knew everything, wouldn't listen and was pompous" (quoted in
• ris, 1935 p.6).
not just the general manager, either. Kets De Vries and Miller
pointed out that powerful top managers in centralized companies
17
exert large influence over important strategic decisions. Kets de Vries
and Miller developed the idea that whole organizations can take on
cognitive and behavioral pathologies mirroring the personality disorders of
top executives. Their central thesis is that top managers' personality
styles:
".
. . may create shared fantasies that permeate all levels; influence
organizational culture; and underlie a dominant organizational adaptive
style . . . greatly influences decisions about strategy and structure"
(p. 267).
Therefore, modern organizational arrangements — such as the rubber-
stamp board of directors — can operate to reinforce strategists' ego-
centric and emotion-driven behavior — especially during a crisis.
1. COGNITIVE ELABORATION AND EfOTIONAL INVOLVEMENT.
i. Illusions of Control. Larwood & Uhittaker (1977) found that
decision makers overestimated the degree to which outcome-events submitted
to their personal control. Successful business strategists felt that they
could easily control people and events. Encouraged by overconfidence,
elaborate but unrealistic crisis-response plans can convince strategists
(and other members) that future events will effortlessly into place.
Hogarth S Makridakis (1981) pointed out that inasmuch as planners aim to
control events, planners are especially susceptible to illusions of control
(also, Schwenk, 1984). The dangers of illusions of control loom large
under crisis circumstance.
2. COGNITIVE REDUCTION AND EMOTIONAL INVOLVEMENT
.
i. Intolerance of Ambiguity and Dogmatism. Intolerance for ambiguity
is defined as:
".
. . . undue preference for symmetry, familiarity, definiteness, and
regularity; tendency toward black-white solutions, oversimplified
dichotomizing, and premature closure" (Adorno et. al., 1950).
Driver & Mock (1975) reported that "decisive" decision-makers became
rapidly overloaded by a complex, structured task. Dogmatic individuals
rapidly decide, but use little information. They cling tenaciously to their
decisions (Brengelmann, 1959) If some strategists can only tolerate
little ambiguity, then they will make ill-considered decisions in crisis
environments.
ii. Experience. Individual's capacities for noticing and attending
to phenomena vary as a function of their experience, and training (Lawrence
& Lorsch, 1967; Dearborn & Simon, 1958; Stevenson, 1976). The speed,
complexity, and soundness of reasoning is partly a function of familiarity
and knowledge organization. Some theorists (Kotter, 1982; Mintzberg &
Waters, 1983; Isenberg, 1984: Ungson et al.,1931) claim that general
managers process information accurately owing to their long and varied
experience. But experience does not in itself constitute an unalloyed
panacea. What matters are the lessons drawn from experience and the
learning strategies applied to current situations.
Studies of intuition show that it is highly fallible (Dawes &
Corrigan, 1974). Their research showed that simple quantitative models can
outperform experts in making certain predictions. Argyris (1985) showed
that "learning" often goes haywire during strategy deliberations for subtle
reasons which executives don't understand. Executives making acquisitions
have little insight into their own decisions (Stahl S Zimmerer, 1984),
This research suggests that the narrowing and focusing functions of
experience are problematic in novel settings.
iii. Motivation. People react to information relevant to their goals
[Einhorn & Hogarth, 1981). Setting high objectives apparently improves
employee performance (Locke, 1968). Consequently, many theorists advocate
IBO or goal-setting to ensure strategists compliance with organizational
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objectives. They reason that a general managers' personal stakes in
strategic decisions will improve their decision-making.
But high stakes, high stress, or high ego investment, can reduce
cognitive efficiency, not just raise it (Schroeder S Suedfeld, 1971).
Incentives increase the liklihood that decision makers will apply
previously acquired skills that work well for simple routine tasks to
complex, novel situations (McGraw S IlcCullers, 1979). Incentives impair
performance on intrinsically interesting, open-ended, non-obvious tasks
(McGraw, 1978). Incentives increase attentional selectivity, and decision
making speed at the expense of flexibility and accuracy (Posner, xxxx).
Fischoff a Goiten (1984) concluded;
"Although the evidence is still sketchy, at the moment there is no good / empirical reason
believe that judgmental biases are reduced appreciably . . . when a
judgement carries high stakes
. . .
"(p. 506).
Therefore, the contemporary romance between MBO and planning is not
an unmitigated benefit. High motivation can have adverse effects on the
quality of strategic thinking in a crisis.
iv. Defensive reasoning. Argyris found three characteristics of
defensive reasoning in strategy making: using soft data, making private
inferences, and relying on conclusions which are not publicly tested
(Argyris, 1935). Defensive routines are hard to spot and destroy because
they are sustained by cultural norms of caring and thoughtfulness — not by
meanness or self-interest alone. Defensive routines quickly take hold when
top managers try to communicate threatening information. For example,
potential changes in strategy or poor job performance of another executive
evoke defensive reasoning.
In top management settings, defensive routines corrupt learning and
make important issues undiscussable. Defensive routines mask an important
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distinction between theories executives espouse and theories they follow in
their interpersonal behavior. They cover-up and bypass the critical need
to examine reasoning and processes. Another result is that executives
remain largely unaware of their own reasoning processes. Moreover, these
defensive routines become self-reinforcing positive feedback loops. The
potential of defensive reasoning for undermining crisis decisions is
obvious.
3. Onm-iES - ESCALATING OK iTIMENTS
Executives personal identification with particular strategies can
entrap them by encouraging "escalating commitments" to bad strategies in
spite of unfavorable feedback (Staw & Ross, 1978). Executives attribute
project difficulties to exogenous events, neglect investment limits, and
ignore information about costs. Apparently, a combination of ego
involvement (responsibility for projects) and illusions of control, channel
decisions toward "forcing" projects which are not working. The stronger a
strategist's original commitment to a bad project, the more likely he/she
will commit additional resources to it.
Staw (1982) delineated four conditions likely to favor escalating
commitments: personal responsibility for the action, personal
responsibility for the consequences, public commitment to the project, and
the irrevocability of the commitment. These conditions surely characterize
many situations when general managers making strategic commitments during a
crisis.
ii. Stress. "Hot" processes are set into motion by information
which challenges the continued viability of a corporate strategy (Janis S
.'.ann, 1977). ll!ot" decision making situations involve uncertainty and
doubt, important self interests, and less-than-perf ect alternatives.
ese situations create strong decision-maker ego-involvement, and engender
^1
acute anxiety about the high risks and high costs of choosing a mistaken
strategy. Such conditions evoke emotional reactions such as hesitation,
vacillation, emotional stress, agitation, and apprehension. Research
shows a fairly consistent pattern of effects associated with high stress-
high arousal (See Eysenck, 1984):
• increased information selectivity,
f faster decision making
• greater reliance on prior knowledge
f reduced ability to identify or discriminate unfamiliar patterns
• increased errors and impaired intellectual functioning.
t When decision makers fear a threat, they try to increase their
control.
Stressful decision processes can lead to defective decision making
processes, for instance adherance to wornout strategies, capricious
changes in strategy, or defensive avoidance of strategic issues. Studies
document how strategic decisions place strategists under emotional stress
(Sorenson, 1966; Nixon, 1962; Wohlstetter, 1963; Iacocca 5 Novak, 1984).
It stands to reason that crisis decisions, decisions which often take place
under time pressure, involve high personal stakes, public commitments to
uncertain courses of action, and political maneuvering, can generate very
high stress levels.
4. SUMMARY OF EGO INVOLVE ENT
There is no theoretical or empirical reason to believe that
strategists are especially detached, neutral, and calculating decision
makers. On the contrary, their unusually high autonomy allows them to give
freer rein to their emotions than other employees, for example their anger
or impatience. Additionally, the work of a strategist has characteristics
which stimulate emotional involvement: highly-visible person.il
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responsibility, high personal career stakes, risky decisions, dealing
with conflicting interests, and extensive interpersonal contacts.
VII. PROMISING TECHNIQUES FOR COPING WITH UNCERTAINTY, COMPLEXITY, AND
MULTIPLE INTERESTS AND EGO INVOLVEMENT IN A CRISIS
Evidence cited above makes a strong case that executives experience
much trouble grappling with uncertainty. Even sophisticated decision
makers experience difficulties learning complex relationships. Strategists
can overlook, mis-specify, or miscalculate conflicts of interest.
Furthermore, logic and research also show that crisis decision making
situations can evoke powerful emotional forces.
Obviously, these difficulties can undermine the quality of decisions.
But this evidence does not amount to an indictment of strategists'
abilities. One need not conclude simply on the basis of this evidence that
strategists are "dumb" or ineffective. To what standards of intelligent
strategic thinking should one appeal? Now high is the general level of
strategic thinking across a set of interconnected set of decisions? Now
important are the mistakes?
Nevertheless, the evidence suggests that such mistakes can endanger
the decision making process — especially during a crisis. For the most
part, these shortcomings are cultural phenomena — not genetic or
programmed phenomena. Therefore these difficulties can be mitigated,
alleviated or avoided altogether, thereby raising the level of
effectiveness of decision making (regardless of how one judges its present
sufficiency).
This section describes techniques which focus on dealing with these
key challenges to quality decision making during a crisis. My objective
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consists in summarizing a "toolbox" of presently or potentially useful
techniques. The discussion is aimed at theorists, consultants and
practitioners who are grappling with the practical problems of decision
making. The proposals gathered here are ones which offer broad support for
a crisis response process, not narrowly-defined concepts merely useful at
one specific stage of decision making. For each technique I outline its
principal focus, the problems which it deals with (or makes worse!) and
important limitations. Finding ways to integrate these techniques
presents an important future task.
1. DIALECTICS AND DEVIL'S ADVOCATE
Dialectical inquiry (Mason, 1969; Mitroff S Emshoff, 1979) and
"Devil's Advocate" (Cosier, 1973) methods offer means for testing the
quality and justifications for strategic decisions. When executives use
dialectics or devil's advocate, strategic assumptions must face challenging
critical evaluations.
i. Method. According to Mason & Mitroff (1981), strategic assumption
surfacing and testing (a formal method for dialectics) is participative,
adversarial, mind expanding, and integrative. The procedure basically
requires splitting up executive groups on the basis of their strategy
preferences, getting them to probe into the assumptions and presuppositions
which surround a particular strategy, testing these assumptions with logic,
debate, and perhaps additional information gathering, and accepting a group
consensus on the best strategy.
ii. Benefits. These methods seem especially helpful in dealing with
uncertainty, multiple interests, and ego involvement. Dialectics or
Devil's Advocate promote the careful examination of uncertainties, paying
attention to stakeholder groups involved with strategy, and exposing hidden
self-interests. 24
iii. Limitations. Although dialectics is heralded as a method for
strategic planning, its scope is limited to testing strategies already
arrived at. If nobody knows what to do, dialectics are no help.
Dialectics provides no help in defining strategic issues, scanning, or
generating alternatives. Nor does dialectics offer help to the
participants regarding how to handle the complex analyses dialectics might
require. Additionally, dialectics' practical effectiveness has become a
matter of debate.
2. CREATIVITY
Creative strategies are vital organizational assets. Generating
creative strategies can represent a key output of strategic planning.
i. Methods. A multitude of methods for improving creativity have been
proposed. Zwicky (1969) recommended morphological analysis. Many
corporations have used synectics (Gordon, 1961) to develop metaphors and
analogies to aid problem solving. "Conceptual blockbusting" explains a
variety of techniques which can overcome or sidestep mental blocks to
thinking (Adams, 1980).
ii. Benefits. Many different creative techniques can produce new
interesting ideas, './ith the exception of synectics, most of these
techniques work on a very narrow scope. That is, they are something
executives do in a couple of hours one afternoon and it' over.
ii. Limitations. Presumably, any of these methods might generate a
novel, valuable strategic idea for practitioners. In doing so, problems of
uncartainty and complexity might be swept aside. Nor do most creative
techniques provide for a systematic evaluation of their creative output.
put it another way, these techniques are tactical, not strategic in
their relevance to crisis response processes.
25
We have few studies which compare different creative techniques in terms
of their utility.
3. MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVE METHODS
i. Methods. Jung (1924) proposed a theory of individual differences
in problem solving. Jung's theory divides decision-makers into four problem
solving types. These problem-solving types derive from individual
cognitive preferences: feeling versus thinking, and sensing versus
intuition. Also, contemporary studies also show that some people are more
cognitively complex than others (Streufert & Streufert, 1978).
Higher cognitive complexity correlates with more fully developed
abilities to differentiate and integrate information, higher stages of
adult development, accurate perceptions, and effective behavior (Bartunek
et. al., 1983). Authors have discussed the implications of Jung's
theory for constructing teams of strategists (Ramaprasad S Mitroff, 1984).
A strategist (or a team) should collect a set of advisors whose cognitive
styles complement each other to deal with a crisis. The cognitive
complaxity prespectives argues that those persons selected should also
score high cognitive complexity, to correspond to the complexity of
strategic issues. All that is required is the administration of simple
standard tests to potential participants.
• Dolman and Deal (1984) developed a scheme for analyzing situtations
from multiple theoretical perspectives. They showed that separate
"structural", "human resources", "political", and "symbolic" approaches
help frame complex situations. "Frames" provide a method for structuring
and categorizing uncertainty, for defining objectives, and for eliciting
alternatives. The method offers help in diagnosis, alternative
generation, and implementation.
• Linstone et. al., (1981) offered a different multiple-perspective
"Ho
approach for dealing with complex technical decisions. Their model
basically derives from Allison's Essence of Decision (Allison, 1971). This
multiple perspectives concept investigates the interrelationships of three
broad areas: technical, organizational, and personal; including elements
technology, physical setting, socio-technical setting, technopersonal
setting, organizational actors, individual actors, political action, and
decisions, A team is chosen, with representatives from each perspective.
These teams are interparadigmatic rather than interdisciplinary. The
output ranges from technical reports, vignettes, interviews, oral
briefings, stories, and fictional formats.
ii. Benefits. Each of these theoretical perspective implies that teams
of strategists surpass individual decision makers in making quality
strategic decisions. The primary improvement comes from a the group's
better appreciation of the complexities of the strategic issue at hand by
virtue of their differences in training, cognitive styles, and
interpersonal orientations. The models also highlight conflicts of
interest, and exploring uncertainties.
Linstone et. al. offers more systematic procedures than Bolman & Deal
or Ramprasad S Mitroff. Additionally, Linstone's ideas of expertise and
communication cover a much broader range than the Bolman S Deal model, and
their procedures are sensitive to political and personal sensitivities of
implementing the process. These are important issues during a crisis.
iii. Limitations. From a time and resources perspective, the problem
of integrating multiple perspectives is paramount. Each of these models
can generate much more complexity than it is prepared to integrate.
Surprisingly, Linstone et. al. are not sure whether integration is either
possible or desirable. Lastly, we have little evidence about the relative
effectiveness of these methods in practical settings.
27
4. DECOMPOSITION AND HIERARCHIES
i. Decomposition methods. Decision makers must decompose complex
strategic issues into smaller elements so that an organization can take
advantage of its specialized knowledge and capabilites. Decomposition
methods also facilitate parallel information processing, which is faster
than sequential processing.
Simon (1960), Braybrooke & Lindblom (1963), Kepner 5 Tregoe (1965) and
described methods for problem separation. MacCriramon & Taylor (1976)
recounted how to look for the changes that precipitated an issue, how to
factor complex problems into simpler subproblems, and how to focus on
controllables to solve problems.
ii. Hierarchies. Hierarchies allows individuals or groups to specify
tangible and intangible elements of a decision problem. Saaty et. al.
(1982) developed a method called "Analytical Hierarchies" to analyze
decisions. It allows groups to assess complex decisions involving
uncertainty, multiple levels of criteria, and multiple alternatives. An
optimum solution is calculated on the basis of these criteria and estimates
of decision parameters and consequences.
Multi-attribute utility analysis (MAU) is another technique for
structuring complex decisions (Taylor, 1984).
ii. Benefits. These methods have the virtues inexpensively using
practitioner preferences and knowledge in combination with with
computationally simple methods. They have the power to integrate complex
considerations. Moreover, hierarchical methods offer the prospect of
rationality and optimality consistent with the spirit of strategic
planning. Also, they work fast.
iii. Limitations. In reiving on practitioner knowledge, oroblems of
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validity, reliability, and self-interest naturally arise. Certain
strategic considerations do not lend themselves to computation. Also,
these techniques tend to suppress the ambiguous and conflict-laden aspects
of information and decision criteria.
5. STRATEGIC DECISION SUPPORT
The rapid evolution of computing systems has made possible interesting
new potential aids for decision making.
i. Methods. Several decision supports for unstructured problems are
now available:
i Cognitive Maps. Cognitive maps use matrix algebra to
represent complex cause-effect relationships (Diffenbach, 1982; Raraaprasad
& Poon, 1985). All that is needed is questionnaire, or console time from a
strategist. Mapping easily adapts to a planning context because the data
derive directly from practitioners' practical knowledge of their industry,
it is mathematically simple, and the software runs on personal computers
(Stubbart S Ramaprasad, 1986). Software provides the user-strategists with
routines to map their knowledge, to explore interrelationships, logic, and
consequences within their maps. Similar methods include systems dynamics
(Forrester, 1976) a systems simulation approach used by interdisciplinary
teams.
*. "xpert Systems. Expert systems are a short step from
cognitive mapping. Designers attempt to catalogue and categorize expert
knowledge. These systems model professional expertise in making inferences
from specific unstructured or ill-defined problems, such as medical
liagnoses or tax planning. Representing the knowledge of expert
strategists would take the first step toward developing "expert strategy
systems." This software could potentially hurdle the barrier of
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"intuitive" strategy, codifying such knowledge, and making effective
strategic thinking available to a wider range of organizational members.
ii. Benefits. Methods in this category are limited to the narrow but
important problem of exploring and understanding complexity.
iii. Limitations. The methods are each limited by reliance of the
strategists existing knowledge. Nor do these techniques contend with the
problems of conflict of interest or ego involvement. Also, crises are
likely to fall outside the normal parameters of expert problems.
6. STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS
i. Method. Freeman (1934) described a method for "stakeholder
analysis" which incorporates the viewpoints and values of a wide range of
organizational participants. Stakeholder analysis integrates a concern for
multiple constituencies with traditional planning queries such as "What is
our business," with new issues such as "who are our stakeholders?" It is a
highly analytical procedure, calling for much information about a wide
range of stakeholders.
ii. Benefits. Its major contribution is the central place it assigns
to the analysis of organizational stakeholders.
iii. Limitations. Freeman's method generates much complexity. But
the stakeholder technique doesn't give much assistance regarding how to
synthecize the complex data it generates, or how to make decisions about
stakeholder issues. Stakeholder analysis says nothing about uncertainty.
Furthermore, it is surprising that a method so well attuned to conflict of
interests is inattentive to the conflict of interest and ego issues which
using the model will bring to the fore.
7. PRCVS.TING GROUPTHINK
i. Method. Janis presented tactics for preventing groupthink in
policy making groups:
3o
i leaders should not state decision preferences at the outset.
6 leaders should encourage criticism and doubt.
8 every meeting should contain a 'devil's advocate'
• split the main group into sub-groups to stimulate options.
9 devote special tine to studying rival's signals and build
alternative scenarios of rival's intentions.
# hold a second meeting after a decision is reached to voice residual
doubts and rethink,
9 bring individuals from outside the core group to each meeting.
I encourage members to discuss the groups' deliberations with trusted
colleagues.
§ establish multiple groups (with separate chairmen) to discuss a
single issue.
ii. 3enefits. Janis (1972) and Janis u Mann (1977) specifically
studies high-pressure, crisis decision making. If all these tactics can be
put into place, then instances of groupthink might be averted. Uncertainty
can be acknowledged under these conditions. With outsiders present, at
least some differing interests might be weighed.
iii. Limitations. Preventing groupthink seems to depend on starting
with leaders and followers who are unlikely to fall prey to groupthink
anyway. After all, "encouraging criticism and doubt" for example, calls
for a rare restraint on the part of leaders and daring on the part of
subordinates. The tactics will increase uncertainty, generate additional
complexity (e.g., additional groups deliberating).
3. DIS-iANTLUr, DEFENSIVE ROUTINES
.
i. Method. Intervention is accomplished by interviews, observation,
and role-playing using case studies (Argyris, 1935). Dealing with
defensive routines requires several difficult steps. First, diagnose and
map the nature of strategic organizational issues. Next, facilitators
guide executives in exploring executives, defensive reasoning processes
about strategic problems and issues.
ii. benefits. Executives learn skills for dealing forthrightly with
threatening information in planning, decreasing the gap between "theories
in use" versus "espoused theories." Confronting and dismantling defensive
routines leads to using more valid data; more explicit premises and
inferences, and testable conclusions.
iii. Limitations. Argyris' method rests on very optimistic
assumptions about how groups of executives can learn to deal forthright ly
with their emotions and self-interests. The method is has no relevance to
uncertainty or complexity issues. Additionally, this process takes a long
time to work.
9. COPING '..TTH STRESS
Organizations can take a number of steps to control the stress levels
of executives who are involved in strategic decisions.
i. Methods. Whetton and Cameron (1984) list a number of steps
for defusing stress:
• Time management training.
# Support networks for executives.
6 Sponsor physical activities.
4 Arrange planning events, meetings, reviews, etc. in
ways that avoid generating unnecessary stress.
ii. Benefits. Stress reduction has a positive effect on
executives abilities to process uncertain and complex information.
Executives experiencing less stress (especially ego-threatening induced
stress) might act less-preoccupied with self-interest calculations.
Studies document some of the stress-reduction benefits of company efforts.
iii. Limitations. Stress reduction probably has no relationship
to conflict of interest issues. Additionally, research evidence about the
relative benefits of different that stress reduction programs is not year
available.
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VIII CONCLUSION
Research evidence shows that crisis decisions place great strains on
human abilities to accurately process information. The intersection of
crisis decision contexts and human capabilites form a central leverage point
driving design considerations.
Because of the enormous variety of circumstances associated with
organizational crises, no single framework of steps is likely to prove
useful in all situations. Therefore, this paper offers no grand, unifying
framework for crisis response.
But the techniques listed in Section xx offer scope for some
integration. For example, an expansion technique like stakeholder analysis
it be linked up to cognitive mapping, and in turn analytical hierarchies.
Planning for crisis response entails gathering a broad array of tecliniques
which can be flexibly brought to bear in line with local circumstances and
conditions. In advance, consultants, technical experts, and executives can
learn to use the techniques, perhaps through simulation.
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